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Data collected during outbreaks are essential to better understand infectious disease trans-
mission and design effective control strategies. But analysis of such data is challenging
owing to the dependency between observations that is typically observed in an outbreak
and to missing data. In this paper, we discuss strategies to tackle some of the ongoing chal-
lenges in the analysis of outbreak data. We present a relatively generic statistical model for
the estimation of transmission risk factors, and discuss algorithms to estimate its parameters
for different levels of missing data. We look at the problem of computational times for rela-
tively large datasets and show how they can be reduced by appropriate use of discretization,
sufﬁcient statistics and some simple assumptions on the natural history of the disease. We
also discuss approaches to integrate parametric model ﬁtting and tree reconstruction methods
in coherent statistical analyses. The methods are tested on both real and simulated datasets
of large outbreaks in structured populations.
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Markov chain Monte Carlo; mathematical modelling
1. INTRODUCTION
Data collected during ﬁeld outbreak investigations are
essential to better understand the clinical and epi-
demiological features of an infectious disease. They
can also provide useful insights for outbreak manage-
ment and control. For example, evaluating the risk
factors governing transmission is important to design
efﬁcient control measures, and identify those individ-
uals that are most at risk of infection or are the main
contributors of infection and should therefore be
targeted ﬁrst.
However, characterizing transmission from outbreak
data can be challenging. First, the transmission process
is usually imperfectly observed. For example, we may
observe the date of symptoms onset of a case, but we
rarely know where, when and by whom a case was
infected. Inference, therefore, requires integrating over
‘missing data’, which may quickly become cumbersome.
Over the last 15 years, data augmentation methods
have been used to tackle this problem: data are augmen-
ted with missing data (e.g. dates of infection) that are
needed to write down the likelihood; in a Bayesian set-
ting, the joint posterior distribution of parameters and
augmented data is explored usually via Markov chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling [1]. This methodology
is now well established in the ﬁeld and has been succes-
sfully applied to analyse a range of complex datasets.
However, for relatively large outbreaks with detailed
data, this approach may require very long compu-
tational times. Interested readers can, for example,
read references [2–11].
The second challenge is that the type of dependency
between observations that is typically observed in an out-
break (i.e. the risk of infection of an individual depends
on the infection status of other individuals) is speciﬁc
to communicable diseases and needs to be accounted
for with dedicated methods. This usually requires that
the statistical model used to analyse the data is explicitly
based on a mechanistic model of disease spread [12].
Transmission parameters of interest, for example, the
reproduction number (the number of individuals infected
by a case), are usually mathematically deﬁned in those
models. Fitting such parametric mechanistic models to
outbreak data can give useful insights on transmission
[7,13–15], but is subject to the same limitations as para-
metric ﬁtting in other ﬁelds. For example, although there
are some exceptions [10], the approach usually requires
to predeﬁne time intervals on which transmission rates
are constant. This can sometimes be difﬁcult to achieve
in a non-ad hoc way.
An alternative approach that has become increas-
ingly popular is to reconstruct the transmission tree
and derive important summary statistics from it, for
example, the temporal trends in the reproduction
number [16–18]. This may give greater ﬂexibility (for
example, there is no need to specify time intervals
with constant transmission rates), potentially at the
cost of larger variance of the estimates [15,18]. However,
since these methods generally only consider disease
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susceptible bulk of the population, they can say little
about the risk factors for infection or provide estimates
of transmissibility in different contexts (e.g. households,
schools or as a function of distance between a
susceptible and an infected individual).
Overall, the two methodologies (ﬁtting of a para-
metric mechanistic model and tree-reconstruction
methods) are largely complementary. Fitting a mechan-
istic model seems to be the only way to account for the
depletion of susceptibles, the information on uninfected
individuals leading to a quantiﬁcation of relative risks;
and it may ensure a better control of the variance of
the estimates. Tree-reconstruction methods can provide
further insights on what effectively happened during
the outbreak with summary statistics on who was
infected by whom, when and where and temporal
change in the reproduction number. They can also pro-
vide a framework to detect abnormal features in the
data that are not initially accounted for in a mechanis-
tic model. It is therefore important that the two
approaches can be integrated in a coherent way.
In this paper, we discuss strategies to tackle some of
the ongoing challenges in the analysis of outbreak data.
We present a relatively generic statistical model for the
estimation of transmission risk factors, and discuss
algorithms to estimate its parameters for different
levels of missing data. We look at the problem of
computational times for relatively large datasets and
show how they can be reduced by appropriate use of
discretization, sufﬁcient statistics and some simple
assumptions on the natural history of the disease. We
also discuss approaches to integrate parametric model
ﬁtting and tree reconstruction methods in coherent
statistical analyses. The methods are tested on both
real and simulated datasets of large outbreaks in
structured populations.
2. TRANSMISSION MODEL, DEPENDENCY
AND COMPUTATIONAL TIMES
Assume that we observe the spread of a disease in
a population of size N from day 0 to day T. For each
individual i ¼ 1, ... , N, let yT
i ¼ 1; if individual
i is infected between 0 and T; 0 otherwise. Each indivi-
dual i is characterized by a vector of Q covariates
zi(t) ¼ fzi
1(t), ..., zi
Q (t)g such as age, gender, location,
household ID, etc ... that may vary with day t.W e
want to quantify the transmission risk factors.
We ﬁrst consider the situation where day ti of
infection of each case i is observed (by convention,
ti ¼ T þ 1, if individual i escaped infection up to day
T). This assumption is relaxed in §5.
2.1. Transmission models
For a directly transmitted disease, the ﬁrst step to esti-
mate transmission risk factors is usually to propose a
model for transmission hazard li!jðtjQÞ from case i to
subject j on day t, i.e. deﬁne li!jðtjQÞ as a function
of the individual covariates zi(t) and zj(t) and a set of
parameters Q. For example, the transmission hazard
li!jðtjQÞ may depend on:
— the time lag t–ti between day t and the day of infec-
tion ti of case i since infectiousness of a case may
vary during the course of infection. The functional
form between li!jðtjQÞ and t–ti will depend on
the assumed natural history of the disease;
— the individual characteristics of subjects i and j.F o r
example, some subjects may be more infectious
while others are more susceptible; and
— the type of interactions that exist between subjects
i and j. The contact rate might, for example,
depend on whether the subjects live in the same
household or go to the same school, etc. It could
also depend on the spatial distance between them.
Examples of speciﬁcations for the transmission
hazard li!jðtjQÞ are given in §§6 and 7. The force
of infection exerted on individual j on day t is
then the sum:
ljðtjQÞ¼
X
fi:yT
i ¼1;ti,tg
li!jðtjQÞ:
2.2. Likelihood and computational time
The contribution to the likelihood of case j is:
PðyT
j ¼ 1;tj ¼ tÞ
¼ 1   exp  
X
fi:yT
i ¼1;ti,tg
li!jðtjQÞ
0
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where the ﬁrst term is the probability of infection on
day t, and the second term is the probability to
escape infection up to day t (the link between the
continuous time and discrete time transmission model
is discussed in appendix A). The contribution of
non-case j is:
PðyT
j ¼ 0Þ¼exp  
X
fi:yT
i ¼1g
X T
d¼ti
li!jðdjQÞ
0
@
1
A: ð2:2Þ
The log-likelihood is therefore:
L ¼
X
fj;yT
j ¼1g
log 1   exp  
X
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The dependency between observations (i.e. the risk
of infection of an individual depends on the infection
status of other individuals) that is apparent in
equation (2.3) means that computational times
required to calculate the likelihood explode with the
size of the outbreak. For example, for the 2001 UK
foot and mouth disease (FMD) outbreak (about
2000 infected premises (IPs) among 130 000 farms),
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culation of the likelihood is over 10
8 [19]. Even with
the recent increase in computational power, brute
force exploration of the system, though feasible, is
very time consuming. Fast and efﬁcient algorithms
are necessary to provide real-time support to decision
making.
3. DISCRETIZATION AND SUFFICIENT
STATISTICS
Here, we explore the extent to which the discretization
of the transmission risk factors can reduce the compu-
tational burden associated with the evaluation of
equation (2.3). Therefore, we now restrict our analysis
to the situation where each transmission risk factor
takes a ﬁnite set of values. We will then explore how
the approach can be used to investigate continuous
risk factors.
3.1. Discretization
Assume that the transmission hazard between two
individuals depends on K risk factors x ¼ fx
1, ...
,x
Kg and that the k-th risk factor x
k (k ¼ 1, ... , K)
takes a ﬁnite number (¼Ck) of values fvk
1;...;vk
Ckg.
The set C of possible values for risk factor vector
x ¼ fx
1, ..., x
Kg has size
QK
k¼1 Ck. For example, the
list of risk factors might include the (discretized) dis-
tance between the individuals (either spatial or
social, e.g. members of the same household), the
time lag since infection or individual characteristics,
such as age.
We model the transmission hazard between a
case and a susceptible individual in the popu-
lation by:
bðx;QÞ¼
Y K
k¼1
bkðxk;ukÞ; ð3:1Þ
where the speciﬁc effect of x
k on the transmission
hazard is measured by function bkðxk;ukÞ 0, and
uk ¼f uk
1;...;uk
Lkg is a parameter vector of size Lk.
This expression makes the simplifying assumption
that the effect of all risk factors on the hazard
can be expressed as the product of the impacts of
each factor. Parameters of the model are
Q ¼f ukgk ¼1;...;K.
Remembering that zi denotes data available for
individual i, we assume here that risk factors for
transmission from case i to individual j on day t are a
function of triplet fzi, zj, tg: xði;j;tÞ ¼f x1
ði;j;tÞ;...;xK
ði;j;tÞg,
where for k ¼ 1, ...,K, xk
ði;j;tÞ ¼ gkðfzi;zj;tgÞ.
The transmission hazard li!jðtjjQÞ from case i to
individual j on day t is therefore:
li!jðtjQÞ¼bðxði;j;tÞ;QÞ:
The total hazard of infection for individual j on day
t is then:
ljðtjQÞ¼
X
fi;ti,tjg
bðxði;j;tÞ;QÞ:
3.2. Reduction of the computational burden:
sufﬁcient statistics
If transmission risk factors are discretized, equation
(2.3) can be re-written:
L ¼
X
fj;yT
j ¼1g
logð1   expð ljðtjjQÞÞÞ
 
X
x[C
Mxbðx;QÞ; ð3:2Þ
where
Mx ¼
X
j¼1;...;N
X
fi:ti,tjg
X tj 1
d¼ti
Y K
k¼1
dxk
ði;j;dÞ;xk:
Here da,b is the Kronecker delta or identity function
(¼1i fa ¼ b and 0 otherwise). Mx counts the number
of day-transmission events of type x, which might
have occurred before time t but did not.
Equation (3.2) has important implications in terms
of computational speed since it shows that the compu-
tational burden can be substantially reduced without
loss of information. The ﬁrst term of equation (3.2)
only involves disease cases; the second term character-
izes the probability of escaping infection up to time t.
So, data needs for inference reduce to:
— ‘case data’;
—t a b l e fMxgx[C of sufﬁcient statistics that characterize
theinteractionofcaseswithanyindividualofthepopu-
lation. It can be pre-computed and stored once, given
they do not functionally depend on the parameters.
4. EXPLORATION OF THE PARAMETER
SPACE AND TREE RECONSTRUCTION
Tree reconstruction [7,16–18] is a useful complement to
the likelihood-based estimates of the parameters derived
from equation (3.2). Here, we present and discuss differ-
ent strategies to perform tree reconstruction and
parameter estimation in a coherent statistical framework.
4.1. Tree reconstruction
Given parameter Q and given that case j was infected
on day tj, the probability that case j was infected by
case i (ti , tj) is simply (see appendix A):
pi!jðtjjQÞ¼
li!jðtjjQÞ
P
k:tk,tj lk!jðtjjQÞ
¼
li!jðtjjQÞ
ljðtjjQÞ
: ð4:1Þ
4.2. Sequential approach
A natural way to integrate tree reconstruction and par-
ameter estimation in a coherent setting is to proceed
sequentially. For example, in a Bayesian setting, a
sample fQmgm¼1;...;M can be drawn from the posterior
distribution of Q via MCMC sampling relying on
equation (3.2). Then, for each parameter value in the
sample m ¼ 1,...,M, a source of infection rj can be
drawn from its distribution fpi!jðtjjQmÞgi for each
case j. This gives a sample of M transmission trees
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we used this strategy when analysing detailed data
from an inﬂuenza outbreak in a school [7].
4.3. Simultaneous inference
Here, we explore an alternative strategy where the
two tasks are performed simultaneously. The method
formalizes those introduced in work undertaken in
2001 on the UK FMD epidemic of that year [13]. The
idea is that the source of infection rj for each case j is
considered as ‘augmented’ data. The augmented log-
likelihood is:
LC ¼
X
fj;yT
j ¼1g
flogðprj!jðtjÞÞþlogð1 expð ljðtÞÞÞg
 
X
x[C
Mxbðx;QÞ
LC ¼
X
fj;yT
j ¼1g
flogðlrj!jðtjÞÞ logðljðtjÞÞþlogð1
 expð ljðtjÞÞÞg 
X
x[C
Mxbðx;QÞ: ð4:2Þ
Denoting Nx ¼
P
j:yT
j ¼1
QK
k¼1 dxk
ðrj;j;tjÞ;xk; the number
of augmented transmission events of type x (x in C),
equation (4.2) becomes:
LC ¼
X
x[C
fNx logðbðx;QÞÞ   Mxbðx;QÞg
þ
X
fj;yT
j ¼1g
flogð1   expð ljðtjÞÞÞ
  logðljðtjÞÞg: ð4:3Þ
In many situations, where the force of infection
exerted on individuals is relatively small, the likelihood
simpliﬁes to:
LC  
X
x[C
fNx logðbðx;QÞÞ   Mxbðx;QÞg: ð4:4Þ
The analysis of the augmented likelihood can be per-
formed in a frequentist or in a Bayesian setting. In the
frequentist setting, it is straightforward to implement
an expectation conditional maximization (ECM) algor-
ithm [20,21] to both derive maximum-likelihood
estimates of the parameters of the model and recon-
struct the transmission tree. The pseudo-code for this
algorithm is given in box 1. In the common situation,
where one is interested in relative risks (i.e. comparison
with a reference group) and where the force of infection
exerted on individuals is relatively small, no maximiza-
tion routine is needed since the maximum value is
simply a ratio of two sums (appendix A) [13]. Conﬁ-
dence intervals can be obtained from the Fisher
information matrix derived at the maximum value for
the incomplete log-likelihood (equation 3.2). The
approach, therefore, requires that the second derivative
of the log-likelihood with respect to Q exists.
Alternatively, inference can be performed in a Baye-
sian setting via MCMC [1], with a pseudo-code
presented in box 2. The key difference is in the way
missing data are handled: in the Bayesian approach,
one realization of the missing data is drawn from its
expected distribution; by contrast in the EM algorithm,
the whole expected distribution of the missing data is
used in the expression of the augmented likelihood.
5. SITUATION WHEN THE DAYS OF
INFECTION ARE UNOBSERVED
Often, the day of symptom onset sj of case j is observed
but not the day of infection tj. As a consequence,
Box 1. The EM algorithm when the days of infection are
observed.
Assume that at the beginning of iteration n,
parameter vector is Qn21:
— expectation step:
(i) for each case j, compute probabilities fpi!jðtjÞgi
given Qn21 (equation 4.1; see appendix A), and
(ii) for x in C, compute the expected number of trans-
mission events of type x :   Nx ¼
P
j:yT
j ¼1 P
i:ti,tj
pi!jðtjÞ
QK
k¼1 dxk
ði;j;tjÞ;xk; and
— conditional maximization step:
(i) for k ¼ 1, ..., K, and
(ii) for j ¼ 1, ..., Lk: maximize LC with respect to uk
j
other parameters being ﬁxed (see appendix A):
LC ¼
X
x[C
f  Nx logðbðx;QÞÞ   Mxbðx;QÞg þ
X
fj;yT
j ¼1g
flogð1
  expð ljðtjÞÞÞ   logðljðtjÞÞg
Box 2. Bayesian algorithm when the days of infection are
observed.
At iteration n:
— update missing data:
(i) for each case j, compute probabilities fpi!jðtjÞgi
given Qn21 (equation 4.1; see appendix A),
(ii) for each case j, draw the source rj of case j from
distribution fpi!jðtjÞgi, and
(iii) for x in C, compute the number of transmission
events of type x:
  Nx ¼
X
j:yj¼1
Y K
k¼1
dxk
ðrj;j;tjÞ;xk;
— update parameters:
(i) for k ¼ 1, ..., K, and
(ii) for j ¼ 1, ..., Lk: MCMC update uk
j relying on the
augmented likelihood LC (see appendix A):
LC ¼
X
x[C
f  Nx logðbðx;QÞÞ   Mxbðx;QÞg
þ
X
fj;yj¼1g
flogð1   expð ljðtjÞÞÞ   logðljðtjÞÞg
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able. If the incubation period (time lag between the day
of infection and the day of symptoms onset) has a
known density f(sjjtj), a common strategy to tackle
the problem is to augment the data with the day of
infection of each case. A particular computational
burden is then that updating the day of infection of a
single case may require re-calculation of the whole like-
lihood as the update may affect the risk of infection of
all other individuals. In order to avoid this compu-
tational cost, we introduce the additional assumption:
(H1) Given the day of symptoms onset sj, infectious-
ness over time is independent of the day of infection tj.
This is, for example, the case if infectiousness starts
with symptom onset. This assumption seems acceptable
for a relatively wide range of diseases since infectivity is
often triggered or inﬂuenced by symptoms. Under H1,
there is no need to re-compute the whole likelihood
each time a day of infection is updated.
It would be possible to extend the EM approach to
the situation when the days of infection are unobserved.
Inference would work as in the previous section except
that one would have to take the expectation on both
the contact tracing information and the day of infec-
tion. However, for this second application, it is no
longer possible to easily derive the variance of the esti-
mates. This is because, although maximum-likelihood
point estimates could be derived from the likelihood
for the ‘complete’ dataset, estimation of the variance
of the estimates has to rely on the likelihood of the
observed dataset (equation 3.2). This expression
cannot be computed here since days of infection are
not observed. The Bayesian approach does not suffer
from this limitation and makes it possible to easily
obtain Bayesian credible intervals (box 3).
6. APPLICATION TO THE FOOT AND
MOUTH DISEASE OUTBREAK WITH
OBSERVED DAYS OF INFECTION
6.1. Data
We reanalyse the 2001 UK FMD dataset presented by
Chi-Ster & Ferguson [19]. The dataset contains infor-
mation on 131243 farms of which 2013 were IPs,
between 7 February 2001 and 5 October 2001. For
each farm, the dataset contains the location of the
farm and the number of cattle and sheep in each farm.
In addition, the data give the estimated time of infection
of the farm (if infected) and the removal time (when ani-
mals of the farm were slaughtered). Details on the data
can be found in Chi-Ster & Ferguson [19].
6.2. Speciﬁcation of the statistical model
We explore how the discretization of risk factors and the
algorithms introduced in §4 can reduce the compu-
tational burden of inference. For simplicity, farms are
partitioned into three groups on the basis of the
number of cattle nc and the number of sheep 3ns:
cattle (cattle farm: nc   ns), sheep (sheep farm: ns .
nc) and small (small farm: nc þ ns , 100) [13].
We assume that the latent period of FMD is 3 days
and that infectious farms remain so until the time of
slaughter. The transmission hazard b between case
farm i and susceptible farm j that is introduced in
equation (3.1) is modelled as a function of the following
characteristics:
— the type (cattle, sheep or small) of case farm i.
We estimate the relative infectivity of sheep farms
ðgsh
I Þ and small farms ðgsm
I Þ relative to cattle
Box 3. Bayesian algorithm when only days of symptom onset are observed.
At iteration n:
— Gibbs sampling for missing data:
(i) for each case j, compute probabilities fpjðtÞgt for the day of infection of the case given Qn21 (see appendix A),
(ii) for each case j, draw the day tj of infection of the case from distribution fpjðtÞgt,
(iii) for each case j, compute probabilities fpi!jðtjÞgi given Qn21 (equation 4.1; see appendix A),
(iv) for each case j, draw the source rj of case j from distribution fpi!jðtjÞgi, and
(v) for x in C, compute the number of transmission events of type x:
  Nx ¼
X
j:yj¼1
Y K
k¼1
dxk
ðrj;j;tjÞ;xk;
— update parameters:
(i) for k ¼ 1, ..., K, and
(ii) for j ¼ 1, ..., Lk: MCMC update uk
j relying on the augmented likelihood. The augmented likelihood is slightly differ-
ent from the case when days of infection are known (equation 3.2). In particular, since days of infection of cases
change during the inference procedure, it is no longer possible to pre-compile and store the contribution of cases
to matrix fMxg (i.e. number of day-transmission events of type x that could have occurred but did not); but one
can still pre-compile and store the contribution fMMxg of non-cases, which is usually the key computational
burden. The augmented likelihood is:
Pðfsj;rj;tjgjjQÞ¼
X
fj;yj¼1g
flogðf ðsjjtjÞÞ þ logðprj!jðtjÞÞ þ logð1   expð ljðtjÞÞÞg
 
X
fj;yj¼1g
X
fi:ti,tjg
X tj 1
d¼ti
li!jðdÞ 
X
x[C
bðxÞMMx
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mission hazard is gsh
I ; if case farm is a sheep farm,
gsm
I if it is a small farm and 1 if it is a cattle farm;
— the type (cattle, sheep or small) of susceptible farm
j. We estimate the relative susceptibility of sheep
farms ðgsh
S Þ and small farms ðgsm
S Þ relative to cattle
farms; and
— the distance dij between farm i and farm j.T w o
models are considered: M1: discrete model.W e
assume that the transmission kernel is a step func-
tion with K þ 1 change points fdkgk¼0, ...,K and
where the multiplicative term on the transmission
hazard is gk
D if dk21, dij   dk. In practice, we take
18 change points f0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10,
15, 20, 40, 60, 100, 200, 400, 10
4g (km). M2: ‘para-
metric’ step function. A continuous transmission
kernel often used in the ﬁeld is
fcðdja;b;cÞ¼qða;bÞ
c
ð1 þð dÞ=ðaÞÞ
b ; ð6:1Þ
where qða;bÞ¼1=
Ð 2000
d¼0 ð1 þ u=aÞ
 bdu is a
normalizing constant. Here, we introduce a discre-
tized version of this kernel. Consider K þ 1c h a n g e
points fdkgk¼0, ...,K.W ed e ﬁ n e  dk; the mean distance
between farms i and j satisfying dk21, dij   dk:
  dk ¼
P
i;j dij:ddk 1,dij dk;1
P
i;j ddk 1,dij dk;1
 !
:
The transmission kernel is the step function:
f ðdja;b;cÞ¼fcð  dkja;b;cÞ where dk 1 , d   dk:
In practice, interval 0–2000 km is partitioned in 250
intervals of length 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 5, 10, 20 and 40 km
between 0–5, 5–15, 15–65, 65–165, 165–415, 415–
815, 815–1015 and 1015–1415 km, respectively.
For the ECM algorithm, we consider that conver-
gence is achieved at iteration n if the relative change
in parameter values between iteration n and iteration
n þ 1 is smaller than 10
27 for all parameters. In the
Bayesian implementation of the model, we specify the
following priors for our parameters. Parameters
gsh
I ;gsm
I ;gsh
S ;gsm
S ;g1
D;...;gK
D all have a gamma prior
G(a, a) with a ¼ 10
22. We also do a sensitivity analysis
for a ¼ 10
21, 1. For model M2, we specify a uniform
prior U[0,100] for kernel parameters a and b and a
gamma prior G(a, a) for parameter c. The MCMC is
run for 8000 iterations with a burn in of 500 iterations.
Transmission parameters are estimated for time
interval 23rd February (when the national ban on
animal movements was introduced) to 5th October
2001, conditional on the state of the epidemic on 23rd
February. Computation times are given for single
threaded code running on an Intel Xeon x5570 system.
6.3. Results
We ﬁrst use the ECM algorithm (box 1) to estimate
model M1 (table 1). Convergence is achieved in only
91 iterations (ﬁgure 1). Total computational time is
1 min 14 s with most of the time (58 s) spent reading
the data and computing the table fMxgx[C of
sufﬁcient statistics (equation 3.2). In particular,
there is no need to use maximization routines since
there is an analytical solution to the conditional max-
imization step (see appendix A). Computational times
are also very short (4 min 28 s) for the Bayesian
algorithm (box 2).
Estimates of transmission kernel M2 are obtained in
6 min 41 s (table 2). Those computational times con-
trast with those needed through brute calculation of
the likelihood (equation 2.3). Replacing model M2 by
the exact continuous parametric kernel (equation 6.1)
and using equation (2.3) does not affect estimates
(table 2); but computational times move to a month
for the same number of iterations of the MCMC, on
the same machine and with no serious attempt to opti-
mize the code. While algorithmic optimization and
parallel programming allows this to be reduced to a
few days [19], the algorithms presented here still give
comparable estimates two orders of magnitude more
rapidly than brute force approaches.
7. SIMULATION STUDY WITH
UNOBSERVED DAYS OF INFECTION
7.1. Simulations
We simulate an epidemic in a city that is structured in
households and hospitals and where community trans-
mission can happen. Table 3 summarizes the structure
of the city. We consider a city of size 400 000 with an
average household size of 2.2 persons and with house-
hold demographics consistent with the 1999 French
census [22]. The city has three hospitals with 2240
Table 1. Estimates of relative infectivity and susceptibility of sheep and small farms relative to cattle farms for model M1 with
the EM and the MCMC algorithm.
EM
MCMC
a ¼ 0.01 a ¼ 0.1 a ¼ 1
infectivity
sheep farm 0.90[0.75,1.04] 0.90[0.76,1.06] 0.89[0.76,1.05] 0.86[0.73,1.00]
small farm 0.60[0.46,0.74] 0.60[0.48,0.74] 0.59[0.47,0.74] 0.57[0.45,0.71]
susceptibility
sheep farm 0.60[0.54,0.66] 0.60[0.54,0.67] 0.60[0.54,0.67] 0.60[0.54,0.66]
small farm 0.17[0.15,0.19] 0.17[0.15,0.19] 0.17[0.15,0.19] 0.17[0.15,0.19]
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J. R. Soc. Interface (2012)staff members and 800 beds each, a bed occupancy of
70 per cent outside the epidemic period for a duration
of hospitalization of 10 days.
We simulate the spread of a disease in this popu-
lation and would like to assess how the techniques
described above can be used to evaluate and monitor
transmission in the different settings (community, hos-
pital and household), infectivity and susceptibility of
different types of individuals (here: children versus
adults) along with the efﬁcacy of the interventions
that are put in place in the different settings. We are
interested in a scenario like the severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) rather than, for example, an inﬂu-
enza scenario; that is a disease for which it is possible
to detect and identify a substantial proportion of cases.
We assume that the incubation period of the disease
has a geometric distribution (with probability 0.3, trun-
cated after 10 days); that individuals start to be
infectious on the day of symptoms onset with an infec-
tivity proﬁle following that time which has an
exponential shape with mean 3 days (truncated after
20 days). We assume that 20 per cent of cases are hos-
pitalized with equal probability of hospitalization
occurring 1 or 2 days after symptoms onset. We
assume that children are 1.5-fold more susceptible and
more infectious than adults. Following Cauchemez
et al.[ 8], we assume that the person-to-person house-
hold transmission rate is inversely proportional to the
size of the household. The epidemic starts with ﬁve
cases infected on day 0. Control measures targeting
community, household and hospital transmission each
with an efﬁcacy of reducing transmission of 50 per
cent are implemented on day 60 of the outbreak.
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Figure 1. Convergence of the ECM algorithm for model M1.
Table 2. Estimates of relative infectivity and susceptibility of sheep and small farms relative to cattle farms, parameters of the
transmission kernel for discretized kernel, f and the continuous kernel, fc.
discretized kernel, f continuous kernel, fc and
brute force inference
a ¼ 0.01 a ¼ 0.1 a ¼ 1 a ¼ 0.01
infectivity
sheep farm 0.89[0.75,1.05] 0.89[0.76,1.05] 0.89[0.75,1.05] 0.89[0.77,1.05]
small farm 0.59[0.47,0.74] 0.59[0.47,0.74] 0.59[0.47,0.74] 0.59[0.47,0.75]
susceptibility
sheep farm 0.60[0.54,0.67] 0.60[0.54,0.67] 0.60[0.54,0.67] 0.60[0.54,0.66]
small farm 0.17[0.15,0.19] 0.17[0.15,0.19] 0.17[0.15,0.19] 0.17[0.15,0.19]
kernel par.
a 1.79[1.4,2.17] 1.78[1.43,2.21] 1.78[1.47,2.17] 1.75[1.43,2.11]
b 2.64[2.5,2.76] 2.64[2.51,2.77] 2.63[2.52,2.76] 2.62[2.51,2.75]
c 0.08[0.07,0.08] 0.08[0.07,0.08] 0.08[0.07,0.08] 0.08[0.07,0.08]
Table 3. Description of the virtual city in which the
epidemic is simulated.
number of inhabitants 400 000
average household size 2.2
number of hospitals 3
number of beds in hospital 800 beds
number of staff per hospital 2240
hospital occupancy outside the epidemic period 70%
duration of hospital visit (days) 10
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cases that are detected in the population. Initially, we
assume that all cases are detected. In alternative
scenarios, we investigate the situations where 50 or
25 per cent of cases are randomly detected in the commu-
nity/hospital, but where follow-up of households with
detected cases is good (90%) and, last, the situation
where detection of cases among household members is
of the same quality as detection of cases in the
community and in hospitals.
7.2. Speciﬁcation of the statistical model
The transmission hazard b between case i and individ-
ual j that is introduced in equation (3.1) depends on the
following characteristics:
— setting, i.e. whether individuals i and j are (i) members
o ft h es a m eh o u s e h o l d ,( i i )h a v ev i s i t e dt h es a m eh o s p i -
tal or (iii) other (i.e. community transmission)—the
multiplicative term on the transmission hazard is
bHous/n (n: size of the household), bHosp/NHosp
(NHosp: number of staff members plus average hospital
occupancy outside an epidemic) and bCom/NCom
(NCom: size of the city). We specify a gamma prior
G(10
25,1 0
23)f o rbHous, bHosp and bCom;
— infectivity proﬁle from symptom onset of case i—
modelled with a normalized discretized exponential
distribution with a mean to be estimated. We
specify a uniform prior U [1,10] for the mean value;
— whether or not case i is a child—we estimate the
infectivity of children relative to adults. We specify
a lognormal prior distribution with log-mean
0 and log-variance 1 for the relative infectivity of
children gI. This ensures that gI has the same
prior as 1/gI;
— whether or not individual j is a child—we estimate
the susceptibility of children relative to adults, gS,
assuming a lognormal prior distribution with
log-mean 0 and log-variance 1; and
— efﬁcacy of interventions implemented in the different
settings (i.e. household, hospital and community).
After implementation of the intervention (day 60),
the transmission rate in the household, hospital and
community is multiplied by parameter gHous, gHosp
and gCom, respectively; where gHous, gHosp and gCom
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Figure 2. Simulated epidemic and information collected during the epidemic. (a) Epidemic curve. (b) Follow-up of households.
(c) Follow-up of outbreaks in hospitals. Pink, child; light blue, adult.
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J. R. Soc. Interface (2012)have the same prior as the relative infectivity and
susceptibility of children.
7.3. Results
Figure 2 summarizes the data that would need to be col-
lected during the outbreak with the age and dates of
symptom onset of cases (ﬁgure 2a), afollow-up of house-
holds with cases and tracking of hospitalizations and
more generally of hospital occupancy (ﬁgure 2b) and a
follow-up of epidemics in hospitals (ﬁgure 2c). Inference
also requires having information on the age distribution
of the population. In the simulated outbreak, there
were a total of 1842 cases with 631 (34%) child cases.
In the scenario, where all cases are identiﬁed, ﬁgure 3
shows how estimates change in real-time. On day 20,
only 31 cases have been detected and credible intervals
of parameters are therefore wide. The credible interval
includes the true value for all parameters except the
relative infectivity of children. On day 30, with 80
cases detected, posterior means are always relatively
close to the true simulation value although credible
intervals remain wide for some parameters like the
relative infectivity and susceptibility of children and
the mean generation time. On day 40 (182 cases
detected), we would rightly conclude that children are
more infectious and susceptible than adults although
here again the credible intervals remain relatively
wide. Properly characterizing the infectivity proﬁle
requires substantially more data (849 cases detected
by day 60). Only 10 days after control measures are
implemented, fairly accurate estimation of the efﬁcacy
of interventions in different settings becomes possible.
When only 50 per cent of cases in the community
and in hospitals are detected, performance of the
approach remains satisfying although as expected cred-
ible intervals are wider and it takes longer for accuracy
to be acceptable (ﬁgure 4). When 25 per cent of cases in
the community and in hospitals are detected, precision
of estimates starts to break down (electronic sup-
plementary material, ﬁgure S1). Although estimates of
transmission rates in the community and the hospital
are not strongly affected by under-reporting in those
settings, this is not true of estimates of transmission
rates in small closed settings such as households
(electronic supplementary material, ﬁgure S2).
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Figure 3. Estimates of transmission rates and relative transmission risk factors as a function of the number of days since the out-
break started when all cases are detected. Solid line, posterior mean; dashed line, 95% Credible Interval; dotted line, simulation
value. For parameters used to compare groups (e.g. relative susceptibility, efﬁcacy of interventions, etc.), we have also added a
thin horizontal line y ¼ 1. Top row gives estimates of the transmission rates in the different settings. Middle row gives estimates of
the relative infectivity and relative susceptibility of children and the mean duration characterizing the infectivity proﬁle. Bottom
row gives the estimates of the efﬁcacy of intervention to reduce transmission rates in the different settings.
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J. R. Soc. Interface (2012)The method also allows disaggregated monitoring of
the reproduction number and the number of cases
infected in different settings (ﬁgure 5).
8. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have presented strategies to tackle
some of the challenges associated with the estimation
of transmission characteristics of infectious diseases
and the risk factors affecting transmission patterns.
The dependency that is typically observed in out-
break data (i.e. the risk of infection for an individual
depends on the infection status of other individuals)
can potentially lead to long computational times. We
showed that if risk factors are discretized, the inferen-
tial problem can be simpliﬁed to the analysis of (i) a
dataset on cases only and (ii) a pre-compiled summary
table on interactions between individuals of the popu-
lation and cases. In the FMD application,
discretization reduced the computational time from
few weeks to few minutes with no change in the esti-
mates of the transmission kernel. It is likely that with
substantial effort and parallel programming, we could
have reduced the computation time of brute force
approach by one or two orders of magnitude. Even
so, it seems unlikely that computational times could
have gone much below few days. This has to be com-
pared with the few minutes needed to run our
algorithms on the FMD dataset. For small datasets,
discretization may provide no computational gain if it
takes longer to explore the set C of transmission risk
factors than to sum over the pairs fcase i, individual
jg. Discretization may be difﬁcult to implement on
particularly complex transmission models [19,23]i n
which case brute force calculation of the likelihood
may be needed.
We presented two strategies to perform parameter
estimation and tree reconstruction in a coherent way.
The ﬁrst one is a sequential approach that we used to
analyse data from an inﬂuenza school outbreak [7].
Here, we implemented an alternative strategy where
transmission parameters and the transmission tree are
estimated simultaneously. There are pros and cons for
each of those strategies. A nice feature of simultaneous
inference is that the information on the transmission
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Figure 4. Estimates of transmission rates and relative transmission risk factors as a function of the number of days since the out-
break started when 50% of cases are detected in the community and in the hospital, and when 90% of cases among household
contacts of detected cases are detected. Solid line, posterior mean; dashed line, 95% credible interval; dotted line, simulation
value. For parameters used to compare groups (e.g. relative susceptibility, efﬁcacy of interventions, etc.), we have also added
a thin horizontal line y ¼ 1. Top row gives estimates of the transmission rates in the different settings. Middle row gives estimates
of the relative infectivity and relative susceptibility of children and the mean duration characterizing the infectivity proﬁle.
Bottom row gives the estimates of the efﬁcacy of intervention to reduce transmission rates in the different settings.
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J. R. Soc. Interface (2012)tree can sometimes lead to very simple and fast maximi-
zation routines in the frequentist setting (see appendix
A) and to very good mixing in the MCMC chains in
the Bayesian setting. However, for small datasets, we
sometimes observed convergence problems in the Baye-
sian implementation of simultaneous inference. For
example, let assume that there are two types A and B
of individuals and that at iteration i of the MCMC, by
chance, all the source cases in the transmission tree are
of type A. If that happens, the chain may then be
stuck at a local maximum where the infectivity of cases
of type B is very close to 0. The EM algorithm does
not suffer from that problem on small datasets; but has
the disadvantage that it cannot be used when dates of
infection are missing. The sequential Bayesian approach
presented in Cauchemez et al.[ 7] may therefore be the
most robust strategy, as it can be used in small datasets
and when dates of infection are missing; but it requires
extra work to tune the variance of the Metropolis-
Hastings proposals to ensure satisfactory mixing.
For situations when the dates of infection are
unknown, we presented models which assumed that
infectivity depends on the time elapsed since symptom
onset, and is independent of the time of infection. This
assumption reduces the computational burden since it
implies that the infection hazard an individual is
exposed to solely depends on measured quantities plus
the parameters of the model, rather than on the unob-
served days of infection of other cases. In practice,
assumption H1 seems acceptable for a relatively wide
range of diseases since infectivity is often triggered or
inﬂuenced by symptoms. However, where the assump-
tion is invalid, more computationally intensive
methods accounting for the unobserved times of
infection become necessary [23].
In the simulation study, we considered an epidemic
for which it would be possible to detect and identify a
substantial proportion of cases; this would therefore
be more applicable to a SARS-like scenario rather
than pandemic inﬂuenza. The simulation study
showed that even in situations where under-reporting
is substantial (e.g. 50%), it would still be possible to
obtain informative estimates of key characteristics.
We found that estimates of the transmission rate in
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J. R. Soc. Interface (2012)the community and in the hospital were relatively
robust to under-reporting in those settings. This can
be explained by the fact that in a large population,
the exponential growth rate of the epidemic is not
affected by under-reporting. But estimates of trans-
mission rates in small social units such as households
were—as might be expected—strongly affected by
under-ascertainment of cases. Estimates of relative
infectivity were particularly sensitive to under-
reporting, with large variance and sometimes important
bias. Estimating relative infectivity is in general quite
challenging because it requires that one can compare
the offspring of one group of individuals (e.g. adults)
with that of another group (e.g. children) and this
becomes very difﬁcult as under-reporting increases. It
is likely that estimates would be less robust to under-
reporting, if reporting rates changed over time, as
probably happens in real epidemics.
Here, we have presented relatively simple approaches
to reduce computational burden in the estimation of
transmission parameters and to integrate parameter
estimation and tree reconstruction in a coherent way.
However, the analysis of outbreak data is subject to
many other challenges. For example, it may be difﬁcult
to infer which parametric distribution should be used
for the infectivity proﬁle and the incubation period;
data augmentation strategies may fail in a context
when data are not missing at random or when there
are false-positives or false-negatives [23]. A particular
challenge in outbreak data is that they are rarely infor-
mative about the incubation period of the disease. In
the simulations study, for example, we made the
assumption that the distribution of the incubation
period of the disease was known. If it was not the
case, one would require extra data to estimate it. For
example, in the past, data from outbreaks in an aero-
plane [24] or in a bus [25] were used to estimate the
incubation period of inﬂuenza.
A key practical challenge to implement the methods
presented here in real time is the rapid collection and
digitization of sufﬁciently detailed epidemiological
data. However, recent experience demonstrates that it
is possible to collect very detailed epidemiological
data even during large outbreaks [10,13–15,25,26].
Cleaning and processing those data so that they are
ready for analysis close to real-time remain a huge chal-
lenge, but the recent examples of the 2001 FMD
outbreak in the UK [13,14], the 2003 SARS epidemic
[15,26] and the 2009 H1N1 pandemic [25] show that
this is increasingly feasible. However, reporting delays
should always be expected and it will be important to
account for those delays in future developments of the
statistical method presented here.
Last, a key limit on the more widespread use of the
type of methods presented in this paper is the relatively
high technical hurdle to implement them, given there is
currently no user-friendly statistical software package
that allows easy implementation of this type of analysis.
Developing such tools is therefore a priority.
We thank the MRC Methodology Programme, the NIGMS
MIDAS initiative, the EU FP7 EMPERIE consortium and
Research Council UK for research funding.
APPENDIX A
A.1. Link between the continuous and
the discrete time transmission
models
We explain here the link between the continuous time
and discrete time transmission models. At any (con-
tinuous) time point u during day t (i.e. u [ [t;t þ 1)),
the instantaneous hazard of infection exerted on
individual j is
l 
jðuÞ¼ljðtÞ for t   u , t þ 1;
where lj(t) is deﬁned in the main text. So, we make
the assumption that the instantaneous hazard of infec-
tion is a step function with daily steps. Conditional on
the fact that individual j has not been infected up to
day t, the probability that individual j is infected on
day t is equal to
1   exp  
ðtþ1
u¼t
l 
jðuÞdu
  
¼ 1   exp
 
  ljðtÞ
 
:
In the continuous time model, conditional on
the (continuous) time of infection uj of case j with
uj [ [tj; tj þ 1), the probability that case i is the case
source is:
p 
i!jðujjQÞ¼
li!jðujjQÞ
P
k:tk,tj lk!jðujjQÞ
¼
li!jðtjjQÞ
P
k:tk,tj lk!jðtjjQÞ
:
And we note that this probability is constant for
uj [ [tj; tj þ 1).
Conditional on the day tj of infection, the
probability that case i is the case source given in
equation (4.1) is:
pi!jðtjjQÞ¼
ðtjþ1
uj¼tj
p 
i!jðujjQÞPðujjtjÞduj
and
pi!jðtjjQÞ¼
li!jðtjjQÞ
P
k:tk,tj lk!jðtjjQÞ
ðtjþ1
uj¼tj
PðujjtjÞduj
¼
li!jðtjjQÞ
P
k:tk,tj lk!jðtjjQÞ
:
A.2. Simpliﬁed routines for relative risks in a
context of small forces of infection
Let consider the common situation where
— we are interested in relative risks (i.e. comparison
with a reference group). For example, the
population is partitioned in Ck groups fnk
1;...;nk
Ckg
on the basis of risk factor k so that the
multiplicative term associated with risk factor k in
equation (2.4) is:
bkðnk
m;ukÞ¼ uk
m if m , Ck
1i f m ¼ Ck
 
— the force of infection exerted on individuals is
relatively small so that the log-likelihood simpliﬁes
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LC  
X
x[C
fNx logðbðx;QÞÞ   Mxbðx;QÞg:
For the conditional maximization of the likelihood
with respect to uk
m in the ECM algorithm (box 1), the
log-likelihood can be re-written:
LC   A þ
X
fx[C;xk¼nk
mg
Nx
0
@
1
Alogðuk
mÞ
 
X
fx[C;xk¼nk
mg
Mx
Y
fi¼1;...;K;i=kg
biðx;QÞ
0
@
1
Auk
m;
where A is a term that does not depend on uk
m. So, the
maximum for parameter uk
m conditional on other
parameters is simply:
^ u k
m ¼
ð
P
fx[C;xk¼nk
mg NxÞ
ð
P
fx[C;xk¼nk
mg Mx
Q
fi¼1;...;K;i=kg biðx;QÞ
:
In the Bayesian setting, if we assume that parameter
uk
m has a gamma prior G(a,b), a Gibbs sampler update
[1] for parameter uk
m is possible in the MCMC with:
uk
m  G a þ
X
fx[C;xk¼nk
mg
Nx;bþ
0
@
X
fx[C;xk¼nk
mg
Mx
Y
fi¼1;...;K;i=kg
biðx;QÞ
1
A:
A.3. Derivation of probabilities Pj(t)
Let Ut ¼ fti; ti, tg and St ¼ fsi; ti, tg, respectively,
denote the dates of infection and of symptoms onset
of cases infected before day t. Hypothesis H1 implies
that:
Pðtj ¼ tjUt;StÞ¼Pðtj ¼ tjStÞ;
so that one only needs the sequence of symptom onset
dates to reconstruct the risk individual j was exposed to
Pðsj;tj ¼ tjStÞ¼PðsjjtjÞPðtj ¼ tjStÞ
and
Pðtj ¼ tjsj;StÞ¼f ðsjjtÞ 1   exp
X
i:ti,t
li!jðtjsiÞ
 !  !
exp  
X
fi:ti,tg
X t 1
d¼ti
li!jðujsiÞ
0
@
1
A:
Given fsj, Stg, the probability that case j is infected
on day t is therefore:
pjðtÞ¼Pðtj ¼ tjsj;StÞ¼
Pðsj;tj ¼ tjStÞ
P
u,sj Pðsj;tj ¼ ujStÞ
:
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